Generally, it is presumed that an interest rate swap hedge of fixed income assets and liabilities will be 100% effective. Specifically, SFAS-133.68 actualizes this effectiveness through its short-cut method (SCM) interest rate risk hedge specification. We show that this presumption is false. This negative finding leads to a severe IAS-39 implementation problem because IAS-39 explicitly precludes the SCM. Furthermore, this problem has major implications for bank (and insurance) capital requirements. We specify a series of remedies for this problem. We believe that the best remedy falls in the fine print of IAS-39.F.5.5 guidance. In this guidance, a "theoretical swap" hedge effectiveness method, (B), effectively, provides FAS-133 SCM treatment for analogous IAS-39 interest rate risk hedges.
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Basel II capital standards are also likely to be impacted because bank capital requirements are derived from reported income and balance sheet statements.
To partially address the Standards' inconsistency and IAS-39 interest rate risk ineffectiveness problems, we outline three classes of remedies: ad-hoc, Implementation
Guidance-based and markets-based. Among these alternatives, the Implementation Guidancebased remedy leads to the most congruence between IAS-39 and FAS-133. The ad-hoc remedies are not fully effective or must also be combined with market-based remedies.
1) Inconsistency of Prospective and Retrospective Interest Rate Risk Hedge
Effectiveness Tests.
FAS-133 finesses the fundamental ineffectiveness of swap-based hedges of bond, loan, deposit and other fixed income asset and liability interest rate risk. The finesse is a direct waiver for swap interest rate risk hedges that have terms that are sufficiently close to the hedged item contract terms.
The simplest example both highlights the hedge ineffectiveness problem and provides a counter-intuitive result -hedge ineffectiveness is large and constant.
Consider a two coupon-paying bond: F interest rate for funds invested or lent to time 1. The rate is stated on a periodic bondequivalent zero coupon basis. With VRN rates paid in arrears, this rate will equal the first period discount rate only at inception, R 1 = F 1 (and on any reset date).
A receive fix-pay float swap, S, is equivalent to owning a coupon bond and owing a VRN. This swap is long the bond and short the VRN. To hedge a purchased fixed rate asset that is funded at floating rates, a pay fix-receive float swap will be used. For a fair value hedge, the definition of this swap-based interest rate risk hedge effectiveness, ε-1, follows:
As a first step in analyzing effectiveness, we determine the impact of an instantaneous change in the short-term rate, R 1 .
If the yield curve is flat, then the interest earned on the first leg of the VRN, F 1 x 100, will equal the bond coupon, C. For any change in the short-term rate and no change in the longer-term rate, the effectiveness ratio is the inverse par coupon yield: 100/C.
For an instantaneous change in the shortest zero coupon discount rate, the effectiveness test result is constant and ineffective. Furthermore for most world economies and relatively short-lived hedged items, the effectiveness test is guaranteed to fail. Because the coupon yield is usually low, it's inverse, the effectiveness test, is relatively large. For a 20% coupon yield example, a drop in the short rate results in a 500% effectiveness ratio. For a two-year coupon bond paying roughly 3% annually, a drop in the short-end of the zero coupon rate curve results in a 3,333% effectiveness test result.
We emphasize that this result is not empty. All coupon bonds must transit the case of having only two coupons remaining. In many market situations, short rates drop or rise while longer-term rates remain relatively constant. To show this phenomenon in the standard accounting context, we treat parallel rate curve shifts below.
Our negative result applies equally to monthly, quarterly, semi-annual or any other noncontinuous coupon paying bond. If the floating rate of the swap hedge is not reset on the hedge effectiveness evaluation date, then movements in short-term rates alone will cause hedge ineffectiveness.
Finally, documented ineffectiveness for the purchased asset case applies equally to fixed coupon liability hedges. Such changes will lead to hedge swap reset date bunching on effectiveness evaluation dates. Minimally, these dates are every fiscal quarter end. The associated payment/receipt lumpiness will cause short-term money market impacts. We understand that many firms will evaluate hedge effectiveness at month end.
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Another way to achieve effectiveness is to transform all current swaps with short-term basis swaps into receiving or paying overnight LIBOR. Clearly, this method ensures that any hedge effectiveness evaluation date is also a swap floating reset date. The basis swap fixed leg would match the original swap hedge floating leg. Alternatively, outstanding swaps with floating legs longer than overnight could be renegotiated. However, swap renegotiation is not standard in the swap markets, and usually requires counterparty agreement.
b) Forward Rate Agreement Strips
Ineffectiveness may be ameliorated using strips of forward rate agreements for each of the swap reset dates. Importantly, these hedges must be separately designated as hedges of each expected cash flow. However, the mismatch of the FRA fixed payments or receipts against the hedge item coupons complicates this structure. Though it is natural to use non-par FRAs to eliminate these differences, a non-par hedge may not qualify as a hedge derivative (IAS 39-AG11, AG35(c)).
c) Cumulative Hedge Effectiveness
Under IAS 39 F.4.2, cumulative hedge effectiveness tests are permitted. If a long-term fixed income underlying is the hedged item, then initial hedge effectiveness may be sufficiently high to offset subsequent short-term hedge ineffectiveness.
With regard to cumulative effectiveness test success, we are not hopeful. To introduce this concern, we extend our analysis of the two-coupon bond hedge item/swap hedge case in a rudimentary manner.
The following Table reports For these calculations, the coupon, C, VRN rate, F 1 , and all zero coupon discount rates, R, are, initially, set to the same value. The local change in the effectiveness test is calculated from the derivatives of the VRN and bond values with respect to a parallel change in the flat discount rate curve, R (t, C and F 1 held constant).
The key feature of the analysis is that hedge effectiveness is better at both low rates and long maturities. In analyzing the different cumulative effectiveness cases, we have reported the results for the minimum maturity that provides an effective hedge on an 80-125 effectiveness test basis. For example, in the 1.25% rate curve case, a bond with fewer than 10 coupon payments will have a cumulative effectiveness test ratio below 0.8. In the low rate and 10-coupon bond case that is reported, relatively high effectiveness at longer maturities (early in the hedge life) is sufficient to offset poor effectiveness at short maturities (late in the hedge life.) To be specific, reference the first period-by-period panel of the Table. In the 1.25% rate case, effectiveness for the 10 remaining coupon bond hedge is 0.909, and effectiveness falls to only 0.506 with two coupons remaining.
On a cumulative basis, these hedges may not be prospectively viewed to be "highly Clearly, the hedge item and swap hedge cumulative value changes do not almost fully offset. Furthermore, our parallel rate curve shift analysis cannot be simply extrapolated to the more complicated rate curve shifts that will occur. Though our results suggest rules-of-thumb like having at least 10 resets in a swap hedge, such rules will fail. The term structure may always shift such that the short-term VRN component of the swap has a significant change in value while the bond component stays roughly constant. A protracted period of such movements cause cumulative ineffectiveness.
d) Dynamic Hedging
Since testing hedge effectiveness on a cumulative basis inevitably entails ineffectiveness, it is natural to consider dynamic hedging strategies that can improve effectiveness. A seemingly 8 simple way to do so is to state that a dynamic hedge will be undertaken and updated when swap ineffectiveness rises to a certain level.
The problem with this approach is that at any point in time the denominator of the effectiveness ratio test (the change in the hedged item value) may go to zero. Therefore, the only way to ensure hedge effectiveness on a dynamic basis is to ensure that no ineffectiveness occurs in the numerator of the hedge ratio. As discussed previously, this outcome requires eliminating variable rate note fair value volatility in the interest rate swap hedge.
e) Cash Flow Hedge
The FAS-133 short-cut method (SCM) for evaluating interest rate risk hedge effectiveness applies to both fair value hedges (FVH) and cash flow hedges (CFH). We have shown that IAS-39's omission of the SCM raises the likelihood of FVH ineffectiveness. The same is true for CFH.
In their treatment of interest rate risk hedges of held-to-maturity investments, both FAS- Under FAS-133, as long as the fixed coupon payment on the swap matched the tenor and rough size of the bond coupons, the hedge would qualify as SCM and be deemed 100% effective.
Under IAS-39, this hedge faces ineffectiveness because the U.S. Treasury bond purchase is often funded through a collateralized repurchase agreement (RP) or through Fed funds borrowing. In this case, realized funding costs won't match the floating rate in the swap.
The following figure plots the spreads between actual funding rates and one month LIBOR. Other LIBOR rates are equally variable and, on average, above the one-month rates.
Therefore, spreads and variability between other LIBOR reference rates and Fed Funds or RP are even higher. With such variability and average differences, IAS-39 swap hedges of domestic ratereferenced funding and reinvestment will require significant monitoring. In fact, all ad-hoc fair value hedge remedies may have to be utilized to generate CFH effectiveness. Among the ad-hoc fixes, the one that is guaranteed to generate effectiveness is a basis swap from the reference LIBOR swap rate into the domestic money market rate. Currently, the Fed Funds swap market is not nearly as deep as the LIBOR market. A repurchase rate-linked swap market does not exist.
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For large financial institutions that fund in well-developed domestic financial markets, this situation will only be a nuisance. The nuisance is increased by the IAS requirement that all hedge transactions must be made externally. Therefore, once an entity identifies the domestic rate to be hedged, it can never move to another tenor of funding or reinvestment. Standard money management practices of lengthening and shortening cash funding and investment may be sacrificed for the sake of maintaining hedge effectiveness.
For smaller entities functioning in less-developed domestic financial markets, gaps between actual funding and reinvestment rates and LIBOR reference rates may be so great as to 6 It has come to our attention that some knowledgeable parties argue that the one-month LIBOR risk in Fed Fundsor RP-based funding cannot be a "hedged item" because one month LIBOR is not "a portion of" of the domestic money market benchmark rates. Reviewing our figure, clearly, sometimes it is and sometimes it isn't. A literal restriction to "apportionment" will imply that no short-term benchmarks exist for collateralized (repurchase) funding transactions. We believe that the one month LIBOR, Fed Funds and RP rates are sufficiently close to permit hedge item designation of any of these benchmark rates as hedged items and derivatives contingent on the other risk as the hedge. With continuing global money market integration, differences between these rates are converging and will continue to converge. The markets are, effectively, substitutes. In accounting terms, any deviations will flow through the income statement and persistent or large deviations will result in ineffectiveness.
preclude any chance for an effective hedge. PriceWaterhouseCooper (PWC 2000) Example 11
realistically shows the likely effectiveness failure of a prime-rate funding swap hedge.
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A final difficulty in applying CFH for non-LIBOR referenced funding and reinvestment risks is that both prospective and retrospective hedge effectiveness evaluation requires calculation of the present value of all rate basis differences. Therefore, any future variation in rate spreads must be modeled and fair valued for hedge effectiveness tests. Needless to say, such estimation and data management activities will be onerous for many international entities that currently have effective interest rate risk hedges. Under FAS-133 SCM, none of these difficulties exist.
3) Implementation Guidance-Based Remedy
IAS 39 is a "principles-based" standard. It is not a "rules-based" standard. Since one of the ad-hoc remedies for interest rate risk hedge ineffectiveness is pure financial structuring or restructuring, we are troubled. Only the cumulative hedge test alternative seems fundamental.
To our knowledge no solution to this problem has been recognized. However, we believe that IAS 39 -F.5.5 points to a fundamental remedy to the interest rate risk-hedging problem, the Method B theoretical swap:
Under Method B, the present value of the change in cash flows is computed on the basis of the difference between the forward interest rates for the applicable periods at the effectiveness measurement date and the interest rate that would have been obtained if the debt had been issued at the market rate that existed at the inception of the hedge.
For the hedge of an outstanding fixed income claim, the phrase is amended:
Under Method B, the present value of the change in cash flows is computed on the basis of the difference between the forward interest rates for the applicable periods at the effectiveness measurement dates and the market interest rate that was obtained when the debt was issued at the inception of the hedge.
The method is further described as follows:
This method also could be referred to as the 'theoretical swap' method (or 'hypothetical derivative' method) because the comparison is between the hedged fixed rate on the debt and the current variable rate, which is the same as comparing cash flows on the fixed and variable rate legs of an interest rate swap.
The IAS example also presents another method (A), and this method is analogous to the swap hedges already considered. In the IAS example, both methods are 100% effective because the hedge evaluation date is also a reset date.
Between IAS-39 Implementation Guidance F.5.5. Methods A and B, and specifically with regard to hedge effectiveness, Method B is preferable. By identifying the fair value of the cash flows being hedged as the expected difference between the swap market fixed rate and floating-variable forward reference rates, the hedged fair value is equivalent to the swap fair value.
Hedge item separation and identification is done in the following manner. The bond The proposed swap hedge effectiveness method is relevant for available-for-sale (AFS) fixed income assets and self-originated or purchased loans, as well as liabilities. If the hedged item is assigned to the IAS-39 "trading" or "other trading" classifications, derivatives and hedge items fair value changes flow through income. In this case, our hedge effectiveness distinctions are unnecessary. Our implementation is also not relevant for held-to-maturity (HTM) assets because interest rate risk hedges of HTM assets are not permitted.
Hedge effectiveness determines whether asset gains and losses offset swap losses and gains, or the swap losses and gains are booked fully in income. We have a simple example: It might appear that this difference is only one of accounting. However, BIS Market Risk rules result in a very large difference between these two methods for bank capital calculations, OCC (2002).
(7) Common stockholders' equity means common stock, common stock surplus, undivided profits, capital reserves, and adjustments for the cumulative effect of foreign currency translation, less net unrealized holding losses on available-for-sale equity securities with readily determinable fair values.
IAS-39), the SCM is all that is available: FAS-133 Fair Value Hedges 21.a.2.b. "One or more selected contractual cash flows (such as the portion of the asset or liability representing the present value of the interest payments in the first two years of a four-year debt instrument)." 21.a.2 concludes "If the entire asset or liability is an instrument with variable cash flows, the hedged item cannot be deemed to be an implicit fixed-to-variable swap (or similar instrument) perceived to be embedded in a host contract with fixed cash flows." is not restricted to "contracted cash flows" and does not exclude "implicit fixed-to-variable swaps." Instead and explicitly, this fixed-to-variable swap hedge is the IAS-39 "theoretical swap" of F.5.5 Method B.
For bank capital purposes, the ineffective swap hedge case will result in a loss, a decrease in retained earnings and stockholders' equity. The Method B accounting doesn't affect income and retained earnings. Furthermore, only equity AFS security-related credits go against bank capital. Therefore, the Method B un-hedged fixed income asset component loss in OCI/equity does not decrease stockholders equity and bank capital. This concern is exacerbated by the current state of most hedged bank loan and asset portfolios. With the significant decrease in global interest rates over the last two decades, bank held-to-maturity (HTM) and AFS fixed income assets have gains and the hedging swaps that fix bank short-term variable rate funding costs, generally, have large losses. Since many IAS-39 interest rate risk hedges are likely to be ineffective, adoption implies that large swap losses will be recognized and limit bank capital. Of course, this capital reduction may be offset with AFS asset and loan sales. Nevertheless, the securitization market in Europe is likely to be severely stressed in the short-and even medium-term by such an offering load. Other potential adopters of both IAS and BIS rules have even less developed securitization markets.
4) Market-Based Remedy
If our identification of the Method B interest rate hedge item is deemed to be inconsistent with IAS-39, then a chasm exists between this standard and FAS-133. Though the European Union (and the rest of the world) has amended it's IAS 39 adoption, the standard will apply to asset hedges.
With IAS-39 standards, financial engineering based-remedies are readily available.
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The most direct hedge derivative might be called the "hedge effective swap." Such a structure would simply add back the variation of the swap variable rate note component from the transaction. At inception, this added feature has zero fair value because the variable rate note is at par. If a hedge evaluation date occurs prior to a reset date, then any over/under effectiveness on the swap will be owed to/receivable from the effective swap counterparty. Generally, such counterparties will be on a mark-to-market trading basis.
The "hedge effective swap" is an improvement on the one ad-hoc remedy that is sure to work: adding overnight basis swaps to outstanding swaps with longer term floating legs. The hedge effectiveness swap would meet hedging needs, while minimizing overnight interest payments and other flows.
"Hedge effectiveness collars" are another potential innovation. The cash flows paid or received on these derivatives would only be made when effectiveness was jeopardized. For the asset hedge, a call would be sold on VRN gains when the gains jeopardize the upper hedge effectiveness bound, and a put would be bought on VRN losses when the gains jeopardize the upper hedge effectiveness bound.
By setting the loss levels appropriately and ensuring a condition for immaterial hedge item changes (not equal to zero), the sold call and bought put values may result in a zero-cost collar. Though the cash flows derived from this collar are not monotonic in interest rate movements, the collar values may be determined in any two factor interest framework.
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A final alternative is to add a particular liability to the asset hedge item and swap hedge portfolio. The liability would be a time deposit with the same rate as the first swap floating leg.
All components of this transaction would be assigned to the trading or other trading IAS-39
classifications. The mark-to-market for these transactions results in no interest rate risk-related profit or loss. The short-term liability in this position must be rolled over on each swap-reset date. The problem with this remedy is the huge increase required in short-term bank liabilities.
With such increases, credit indentures and regulatory capital limits could be breached. In the U.S., FAS-133 interest rate risk SCM mitigates these concerns.
5) Conclusion
Current interpretations and guidance for IAS-39 interest rate risk hedges will result in significant and random hedge ineffectiveness. Since the IAS Board (BC132-136) has strongly rejected the alternative SFAS-133.63 interest rate hedge short-cut method, the standards differ substantially. Furthermore, this difference has implications under contract terms, compensation agreements and capital adequacy regulations that are extraordinary.
We have proposed, ad-hoc, Implementation Guidance-based, and market-based remedies to this problem. The ad-hoc remedies are either potentially ineffective or require changes in financial management practice that will be costly for large market participants and, potentially, infeasible for smaller entities. The market-based remedies, while feasible, will have costs and, again, may not be available to smaller entities.
Our recommended remedy is a particular interpretation of a distinction already in the Standard Implementation Guidance, F5.5. If an entity is permitted to designate the fixed coupon 11 See Brennan-Schwartz (1982) , Heath-Jarrow-Morton (1992) , Duffie-Kan (1996) , and Hull-White (1994 High effectiveness is both expected and achieved under this hedge identification and implementation approach. Carrying the example forward to November month end, the effectiveness test level is 100%. Should October 2003 be a quarter or fiscal year-end, then income statement and balance sheet entries will be made. With regard to the actual accounting entries made for this hedge, IAS-39 (like FAS-133) leaves fairly wide discretion.
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Prospective and retrospective effectiveness evaluation may not be a trivial exercise for many entities. Careful modeling of forward rates, accruals and discount rates are necessary to identify and evaluate effectiveness. Nevertheless, effectiveness evaluation results will be 100% effective for swap hedges that meet FAS-133 SCM requirements. Therefore, we suggest that materiality considerations imply that these hedges need not be reevaluated for effectiveness after initiation and prospective effectiveness demonstration. Actually, even this documentation is unneeded because any hedge effectiveness variability will be immaterial.
With regard to the actual accounting entries made for this hedge, IAS-39 (like FAS-133) leaves fairly wide discretion. Discounting is done with spot rates corresponding to actual/360 forward rates. 16 "A company could elect to do their bookkeeping using the synthetic-style entries. Fas-133 and IAS-39 do not address 'geography' of recorded amounts." (E&Y, 2001, pg. 5.26.) 
